Abstract. A verifiably encrypted signature can convince the verifier that a given cipher-text is the encryption of a signature on a given message. It is often used as a building block to construct optimistic fair exchange. Recently, Gu et.al gave an ID-based verifiably encrypted signature scheme and claimed that their scheme was secure in random oracle model. Unfortunately, in this works, we show that their scheme is insecure. And we can mount to universal forgery attack in their model. In other words, any one is able to forge a verifiably encrypted signature on arbitrary message m. Subsequently, a novel verifiably encrypted signature scheme (VES) is proposed and the scheme is proven secure in random oracle model. Moreover, the size of verifiably encrypted signature in our scheme is shorter than that of Gu et.al 's signature.
Introduction
A verifiably encrypted signature, which was proposed by N.Asokan [7] , provides a way to encrypt a signature under a designated public key and subsequently prove that the resulting ciphertext indeed contains such a signature. It enables to construct optimistic fair exchange [4, 5] over the Internet, and relies on a trusted third party call Adjudicator, in optimistic way, that the adjudication is only needed in cases where a participant attempts to cheat the other or simply crashes. Another key feature of VES is that a participant can always force a fair and timely termination, without the cooperation of the other participants. Neither party can be left hanging or cheated so long as the adjudicator is available.
A valid VES can convince the verifier that a given cipher-text is the encryption of a signature on a given message. Alice creates a VES on a message by using her private key and an Adjudicator's public key. Bob is convinced that the encrypted signature is indeed of Alice, which he verifies using the public key of Alice and the Adjudicator. Even though Bob does not have the capability of decrypting the VES, the verification is performed without revealing any information about Alice's signature. If a dispute, the adjudicator can extract Alice's signature from VES on the message.
Since the concept of VES was included,J.Camenish [6] and G.Ateniese [7] proposed a verifiable encryption signature based on the discrete logarithm problem, respectively. In 2003, Boheh et.al [8] and Zhang et.al [9] proposed a verifiably encryption signature with security proofs in random oracle based on bilinear Pairings, respectively. In ICDCIT 2005, M.Choudary Gorantla et.al [2] proposed a novel verifiably encrypted signature without random oracle. Recently, by combining ID-based public key cryptography with verifiably encrypted signature, Gu et.al [1] proposed a ID-based verifiably encrypted signature scheme based on Hess' signature scheme (Gu et.al scheme for short), and claimed that their scheme was secure in random oracle model. Unfortunately, in this work, we show that Gu et.al scheme is universal forgeable. Namely, any one can forge a verifiably encrypted signature on arbitrary a message. Subsequently, we propose a novel secure verifiably encrypted signature scheme, and the scheme is proven secure in random oracle model. Moreover, the size of verifiably encrypted signature in our scheme is shorter than that of Gu et.al 's signature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review some preliminaries . In section 3, we briefly recall Gu et.al scheme and show that the scheme is insecure in section 4. In section 5, we propose our VES scheme and prove it to be secure in section 6. Finally, we draw this paper.
Preliminaries
In the section, we first briefly describe bilinear Parings and some related mathematical problems, which form the basis of security for our scheme.
Let (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ·) be two cyclic groups of order q. Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a map which the following properties.
-Bilinear: ∀P, Q ∈ G 1 , and a, b ∈ Z q , e(aP, bP ) = e(P, P ) ab -Non-degeneracy: There exists P, Q ∈ G 1 such that e(P, Q) = 1,in other words, the map doesn't send all pair in G 1 × G 1 to the identity in G 2 . -Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for any P, Q ∈ G 1 .
Such a bilinear map is called an admissible bilinear pairing. The Weil Parings and Tate Pairings of elliptic curves are able to construct an efficient admissible pairings. The security of our proposed scheme is related to the computational DiffieHellman problem (CDHP), which is given below. The success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time A in solving CDH problem in G 1 is defined to be
The CDH assumption states that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, Succ A verifiably encrypted signature scheme should satisfy the following properties;
-Unfogeability: It is difficult to forge a valid verifiably encrypted signature in polynomial time.The advantage in existentially forging a verifiably encrypted signature of an algorithm F , given access to a verifiably-encrypted-signature creation oracle S and an adjudication oracle A, along with a hash oracle, is
The probability is taken over the coin tosses of the key-generation algorithms, of the oracles, and of the forger. The forger is additionally limited in where its forgery on M must not previously have been queried. -Opacity: Given a verifiably encrypted signature, it is difficult to extract the ordinary signature on the same message from the verifiably encrypted signature time without the help of the Adjudicator. The advantage in extracting a verifiably encrypted signature of an algorithm ε , given access to a verifiably-encrypted-signature creation oracle S and an adjudication oracle A, along with a hash oracle, is
The probability is taken over the coin tosses of the key-generation algorithms, of the oracles, and of the forger. The extraction must be nontrivial: the adversary must not have queried the adjudication oracle A at M .
In the section, we briefly recall Gu et.al 's scheme. Please the interested reader refer to [1] for general reference. Private keys are generated for entities by a trusted third party called a private key generator (PKG for short ). Let (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ·) be two cyclic groups of order q, P be a generator of G 1 , e : G 1 × G 1 −→ G 2 be an admissible bilinear pairing. Gu-Zhu scheme consists of the following algorithms:
-Setup: Given (G 1 , G 2 , q, e, P ), randomly choose a number s ∈ Z * q and set P pub = sP . Then choose three hash functions G 2 , q, e, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 ) . The master key is s.
PKG uses this algorithm to extract the user's private key D X , and gives D X to the user by a secure channel.
-Sign: Given a private key D X of a user and a message m, pick k ∈ Z * q at random, and output a signature (r, U ), where r = e(P, P ) k , h = H 2 (m, r) and U = hD X + kP .
-Verify: Given a signature (r, U ) of an identity ID X on a message m, compute h = H 2 (m, r) and check whether the following equation holds
-VE-Sign: Given a secret key D X , a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and an adjudicator's identity ID A .
1
. output the verifiably encrypted signature (r, V, U 1 , U 2 ).
-VE-Verify: Given a verifiably encrypted signature (r, V, U 1 , U 2 ) of a message m, compute h = H 2 (m, r), and accept this signature if and only if
-Adjudication: Given the adjudicator's secret key D A , and a valid verifiably encrypted signature (r, V, U 1 , U 2 ) on the message m, compute
, finally, output the original signature (r, U ).
Security Analysis
Gu et.al claimed that their scheme [1] was secure in random oracle model. In this section, we will show the scheme is universally forgeable by analyzing its security. Note that any one can forge a verifiable encryption signature on arbitrary a message without the private key D X of the user with the identity ID X . To forge a verifiably encryption signature of the user with the identity ID X , The forging procedures are as follows:
1. Given arbitrary a message m, randomly choose r 2 ∈ Z q , then compute r = e(P, r 2 Q X ),h = H 2 (m, r) and Q X = H 1 (ID X ) . 2. randomly choose r 3 ∈ Z q and set U 2 = −Q A + r 3 Q X . 3. randomly choose r 4 ∈ Z q and compute
Then the forged verifiably encryption signature is (r, V, U 1 , U 2 ). If the forged signature (r, V, U 1 , U 2 ) satisfies the verification equation (1) of the above verifiably encryption signature, then it means that the forged signature is valid. In the following, we show that the above forgery attack satisfies the verification equation (1) . Since
Thus, our forged verifiably encryption signature can satisfy the verifying phase of Gu et.al 's scheme. It implies that our forgery attack is successful. An important reason to such attack is that any one that possesses of the user's original signature (U, r) on the message m, can produce a verifiably encrypted signature on the message m. Thus, if the Hess's signature is forgeable, then we can forge a verifiably encrypted signature; but if Gu et.al scheme is forgeable, then it don't mean the Hess's signature scheme is forgeable. Therefore, the Hess's signature scheme is not equivalent to Gu et.al scheme.
According to the verification, we can know that Gu et.al 's scheme is insecure, any one can forge a verifiably encryption signature on arbitrary a message m. The reason to mount to the attack is that the relation between U 1 and U 2 cannot be reflected in the verification phase of verifiably encryption signature. U 1 and U 2 is mutually independent in the verifying equation.
Our Proposed Scheme
In the section, we will propose a novel ID-based verifiably encryption signature scheme. We assume that (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ·) be two cyclic groups of order q, P be a generator of G 1 , e : G 1 × G 1 −→ G 2 be an admissible bilinear pairing. The detail procedure is as follows: Setup: Given (G 1 , G 2 , q, e, P ), randomly choose a number s ∈ Z * q and set P pub = sP . The adjudicator randomly chooses a s A as his private key and compute his public key Q A = s A P . Then choose three hash functions G 2 , q, e, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 ) . The master key is s.
Extract: Given an identity ID X ∈ {0, 1} * of a user, compute Q X = H 1 (ID X ) ∈ G 1 ,D X = sQ X . PKG uses this algorithm to extract the user's private key D X , and gives D X to the user by a secure channel. Sign phase Given a private key D X of a user and message m, pick k ∈ Z * q at random, and compute * and an adjudicator's public key Q A . He computes as follows:
-output the verifiably encrypted signature (r, V, U 2 ) on the message m. VE-Verify: Given a verifiable encrypted signature (r, V, U 2 ) of a message m, a verifier first computes h = H 2 (m, r · e(U 2 , P )), and accepts the signature if and only if
Adjudication: Given a verifiably encrypted signature (r, U 2 , V ) on a message m, the adjudicator can extract as follows: he computes
is the extracted signature on the message m.
Analysis
In this section, we first justify the validity of the scheme and subsequently the security of the scheme.
[Correction] It is obvious, the detail analysis is given in full paper.
[Security Analysis]
In the subsection, we will analyze the security of our proposed scheme and show the scheme is secure against existential forgery and extraction . 
Proof. Suppose that there exists a verifiably-encrypted-signature forger algorithm V, then we can construct a forger algorithm F for the Hess signature scheme. (Note that: the Hess signature is proven secure in random oracle model, please interested reader refer [11] to the complete content). The Hess-signature forger F is given a public key ID X , and has access to a signing oracle for ID X and two hash oracles. It simulates the challenger and runs interacts with V as follows: 
query, Algorithm F makes a query to its own hash oracle H 1 (·),(or H 2 (·), E(·)), receiving some value, with which it responds to V's query. -H 3 − Oracle: for a query (U 2i , r i ) to H 3 , F first checks whether H 3 (U 2i , r i ) is defined. if it exists, then return the corresponding value. If not, randomly choose h i ∈ Z q , and set H 3 (U 2i , r i )) = h i and return h i to V. -VESig Oracle: When algorithm V requests a signature on some string M under the user with the identity ID X and the adjudicator' public P A , algorithm F queries its signing oracle with input (ID X , M ) and obtains the reply (U, r). Then F computes as follows: 1. randomly choose k 1 ∈ Z q . 2. compute r = r · e(P, −k 1 P ) and U 2 = k 1 P . 3. then compute V = U − k 1 P + k 1 H 3 (U 2 , r )Q A Finally, the algorithm F returns (r , U 2 , V ) to VESignature on the string M . -Adjudication Oracle: Algorithm V requests adjudication for (r, U 2 , V ), a verifiably encrypted signature on a message M under the user with the identity ID X and adjudicator key P A . Algorithm F checks that the verifiably encrypted signature is valid, then computes as follows:
-Output: Finally, if V outputs a valid and nontrivial verifiably encrypted signature (r
